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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (18 Oct 67) FOR OT RD-670262

25 October 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters,
2d Battalion (175mm)(SP), 94th Artillery

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
2D BATTALION (175mm)(SP), 94TH ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96269

AVFA-AT-2/94

30 April 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

TO: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam Artillery
APO 96350

SECTION I: (U) SIGNIFICANT UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General - this is the second report of this unit.

a. During the reporting period the battalion continued to build its base camp. As the tent frames were finished and occupied, continued command emphasis was placed on sandbagging sleeping quarters to a level above an individual lying on a cot. In addition, sandbagged bunkers were constructed at both ends of each sleeping tent, but overhead cover was not added due to lack of timbers to support a roof. After the monsoon rains subsided in March, long zigzag trenches were dug and overheaded using dirt-filled powder canisters and sandbags.

b. On 22 February this battalion fired the first artillery mission into North Vietnam against an antiaircraft site. As of 30 April, 23,810 rounds have been fired against various military targets in North Vietnam.

c. Since 26 February one battery of this battalion has been located at Gio Linh (YD21257411), 2 miles south of the DMZ. There have been 22 separate attacks by enemy mortars and artillery. As of 30 April, equipment losses had been moderate, 9 WIA's and 1 KIA has been sustained.

2. (U) Intelligence

a. General. Intelligence information for this battalion is provided by the US Marine Corps.

b. Weather. The monsoon season ended in Quang Tri Province in mid-March. The beginning of the dry season is characterized by early-morning and evening ground fog. Mean daytime temperature is 76-84 degrees.

c. Forward Observers. Ground observation is a continuing problem due to heavy vegetation and the presence of ground fog and haze.

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d. Aerial Observers. Aerial observation in this area has improved with weather conditions. All aircraft are provided by the 12th Marine Regiment with four US Army aircraft supplementing organisational aircraft. Marine and Army aerial observers are scheduled on a rotating basis. This battalion is authorized two aircraft by TO&E, however, none have been made available to the battalion.

e. Meteorological Data. The battalion metro section continues to provide electronic met messages ranging from 10 to 12 lines on a schedule of three met messages per 24-hour period.

3. (C) Operations and Training Activities

a. Plans. 3d Marine Division OPLAN 377-66 (currently under revision).

b. Operations.

(1) Mission. The battalion provides, from positions at Camp J J Carroll (YD063545), Gio Linh (YD213741) and Dong Ha (YD22825822), GS to the 3d Marine Division. Supporting fires for the Khe Sanh area can be provided on call. Battery A (BS630852) provides GS to the 1st Marine Division in the vicinity of Chu Lai, and can fire in support of the Special Forces Camps - Tra Bong, Ha Thang, and Minh Ling.

(2) Organization

(a) From 1 thru 26 February the battalion organization remained constant and was composed of the following elements located at Camp J J Carroll except for short duration displacements as discussed in paragraph 3b(4) below:

1. Hqs and Hqs Btry
2. Btry B
3. Btry C
4. Btry B 6th Bn 27th Arty (Attached)
5. M Btry 4th Bn 12th Marines (Operational control)

(b) From 27 February thru 24 March 1967 Btry B 2/94 moved to Gio Linh (YD213741) and was under the operational control of the Gio Linh Provisional battalion. Btry B returned to Camp J J Carroll on 24 March.

(c) From 24 March thru 30 April 1967 Btry B 6th Bn 27th Arty occupied the Gio Linh position under operational control of the Gio Linh Provisional battalion. (Inclosure 1)

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(d) From 14 thru 30 April 1967 Btry C occupied a position at Dong Ha (YD22825822) but remained under battalion control.

(e) On 29 April 1967 operational control of M Btry 4th Bn 12th Marines (155mm SP Howitzer) was terminated. (Inclosure 2)

(f) Btry A remained in position vicinity of Chu Lai (BS631851) but on 17 April 1967 was attached to the 3d Bn 18th Arty. (Inclosure 2)

(3) Capabilities. From the Camp J J Carroll position the battalion can support Khe Sanh and fire across the DMZ from the Gulf of Tonkin on the east to coordinates XD755651 in the west. The western 13 kms of the DMZ are out of range. The battery at Gio Linh extends the range of the 175mm gun north of the DMZ. The battery at Dong Ha gains some additional range into North Vietnam and also provides fire support for Quang Tri City (YD33785318) and fires into the Hai Lang National Forest Preserve. Battery A supports the Special Forces Camps ag Tra Bong (BS 344880) and Ha Thanh (BS394702), but must displace to coordinates BS636785 to support Minh Long (BS540518).

(4) Displacements

(a) Btry B 6th Bn 27th Arty attached to this battalion, displaced one platoon from Camp J J Carroll to vicinity Dong Ha (YD228583) to support 3d Marine Division operations east of Quang Tri. The platoon displaced on 2 February 1967 and returned on 17 February 1967.

(b) Btry M (155 mm)(SP), 4th Bn 12th Marines, under OPCON of this battalion, displaced from Camp J J Carroll to vicinity of the "Rockpile" (XD983543) to support 3d Marine Regiment operations. The battery displaced on 9 February 1967 and returned on 21 February 1967.

(c) Btry C displaced one platoon from Camp J J Carroll to vicinity of the "Rockpile" (XD983543) to support Recon near the Laotion border. The platoon displaced on 7 February 1967 and returned on 9 February 1967.

(d) Btry B displaced one platoon from Camp J J Carroll to vicinity Dong Ha (XD228583) to support 3d Marine Division operations. The platoon displaced on 17 February 1967, (see subparagraph 3 b (f) (g) below.

(e) Btry C displaced one platoon from Camp J J Carroll to vicinity of the "Rockpile" (XD983543) to support a CIDG patrol sweeping to the south from Ca Lu. A reconnaissance for further displacement was conducted in the vicinity of Ca Lu (XD013458), however, the patrol was extracted before displacement was required. The platoon displaced on 23 February and returned on 24 February 1967.

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(f) Btry M 4th Bn 12th Marines displaced two platoons from Camp J J Carroll to vicinity of the "Rockpile" (XD983543) to support 3d Marine Regiment operations XD888475 to XD855472. The operation was cancelled because weather precluded helicopter operations. One platoon returned to base camp on 28 February 1967, One platoon remained at XD 983543 to provide fire support to the 11th Engineer Battalion constructing bridges on Route 9 between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh. The platoon returned to Camp J J Carroll on 3 March 1967.

(g) Btry B (minus) displaced from Camp J J Carroll to Dong Ha at 260900 February 1967. The battery (minus) plus the platoon in position vicinity Dong Ha further displaced from Dong Ha to vicinity Gio Linh (YD213741) to extend the 175mm gun range into North Vietnam. The battery displaced from Dong Ha at 261130 February 1967 and returned to Camp J J Carroll on 24 March 1967.

(h) Btry C displaced one platoon from Camp J J Carroll to the vicinity of the "Rockpile" (XD983543) to support Recon Patrol Striker. The platoon displaced on 26 February 1967 and returned on 1 March 1967.

(i) Btry M 4th Bn 12th Marines displaced from Camp J J Carroll to YD063573 to support 3d Marine Regiment operations. The battery displaced on 4 March 1967 and returned on 5 March 1967.

(j) Btry M 4th Bn 12th Marines displaced two platoons from Camp J J Carroll to vicinity the "Rockpile" (XD983543) to support 3d Marine Regiment operations and the 11th Engineer Battalion improving Route 9 between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh. One section returned to Camp J J Carroll and three sections remained in position at XD983543.

(k) Btry B 6th Bn 27th Arty displaced from Camp J J Carroll to vicinity Gio Linh (YD213741) to relieve Btry B this battalion, in place. The battery displaced 24 March 1967.

(l) Btry C displaced to vicinity Dong Ha (YD228583) to support Quang Tri and Hai Lang. The battery displaced on 14 April 1967.

(m) The battery operating vicinity Gio Linh is under the operational control of the Gio Linh Provisional Artillery Battalion currently comprised of a headquarters element from 1st Battalion 12th Marines; Btry B 6th Bn 27th Arty; one Infantry Company; Btry C (105mm) 1st Battalion 12th Marines; and one section of 40mm guns reinforced by two squads of quad 50's from 1st Battalion 44th Artillery.

(5) Ammunition Expenditures. The following are the total rounds fired during the period:

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	<u>Btrys B, C, & D</u>	<u>Btry A</u>
February	6,405	1,054
March	16,476	2,378
April	<u>15,567</u>	<u>2,610</u>
Total	38,448	6,042

(6) Gun Tubes Expended. 57 Tubes were changed during the reporting period.

(7) Other Attachments. The battalion has exercised operational control of Battery M (155mm)(SP), 4th Battalion, 12th Marines, since 16 December 1966. Btry M has the independent mission of GSR to 1st Battalion, 12th Marines in addition to its GS mission under OPCON of this battalion. OPCON was terminated 29 April 1967.

c. Training. No change from previous report.

d. Chemical. No change from previous report.

e. PSYWAR. Not applicable.

f. Firing platforms. Twelve gun platforms have been completed at Camp J J Carroll and have proven satisfactory for all firing including extensive firing with charge 3. Four gun platforms have been completed at Btry A's position area vicinity Chu Lai.

4. (U) Logistics

a. Support structure. The battalion remains deployed in 3d Marine Division TAOR with Army Logistical Support provided by a Task Force of 1st Log Command from Da Nang Sub Area Command.

(1) Class I & III are requisitioned and drawn from Marine facilities (FLSU).

(2) Class II & IV are requisitioned thru task force from Da Nang Sub Area Command.

(3) Class V is provided by the 1st Log Command Task Force and stored in the Marine ASP until drawn by this unit.

(4) Medical supplies are requested and drawn from Marine facilities at Dong Ha.

b. Support Adequacy

(1) Class I & III procured thru FLSU at Dong Ha have posed no problem.

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(2) Class II & IV Support has improved since the last report submitted. At no time has the battalion been unable to perform its combat mission due to any shortage of II and IV items. Some problem areas remain, however, and are considered worthy of inclusion in this report.

(a) The problem of equipping newly arrived personnel, either from in country or pipeline sources, with TA50-901 has posed problems. These individuals usually arrive with little or no equipment authorized by TA 50-901. Further, a requirement exists that personnel being transferred within country must depart fully equipped. In order to maintain sufficient levels of such equipment, it has been necessary to have individuals leaving the battalion turn in such equipment, particularly "Flak" jackets, helmets, and helmet liners, in order that newly assigned personnel may be so equipped. Further, Loans or lateral transfers from local USMC units has helped alleviate critical period of shortage. Nevertheless, the overall shortage of TA 50-901 has and does pose problems, particularly in this area.

(b) The frequency and violence of enemy attacks on this battalion has caused numerous fires on vehicles, structures, and bunkers. On vehicles, extinguishers are not entirely satisfactory for fighting large fires induced by enemy action. Some water type stirrup pumps have been received, but these are not satisfactory, particularly around the guns and ammo storage areas. Refill action on foam and dry chemical action extinguishers has been slow. Experiences in this battalion indicate that a more rapidly responsive system for recharging and/or re-issuing fire extinguishers is essential. The battalion has also requisitioned larger type extinguishers, such as used in POL dumps. It is believed that such extinguishers, when procured and delivered will be of material use in fighting fires. The type of extinguishers required is a foam type, capable of projecting a stream a minimum of 25 to 50 feet, and on wheels for mobility. Such an extinguisher would be a valuable asset for this battalion. A minimum of two per battery is considered essential and four per battery would enlarge the fire protection capabilities during periods of combat duress.

(3) The supply of small expendable items has improved materially since the battalion has procured accounts with the NSA Mart in Danang.

(4) Class V supply has been adequate. The high rate of ammunition expenditures required by Operation Highrise necessitated a series of combat essential airlift resupply of Class V in March and early April. At no time was the battalion without ammunition. Handling, storage, and control of ammunition at the Dong Ha ASP has been hampered by a lack of sufficient logistical personnel and handling equipment. Personnel from this battalion, as well as equipment, have been provided to the Task Force for assistance in this problem area. The prodigious amount of all types and calibers of ammunition expanded in this area during the period of this report indicate that an augmentation of ammunition handling personnel and equipment would be extremely desirable.

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(5) Maintenance Support and Supply

(a) Gun maintenance has been excellent during the period.

(b) Gun repair parts have generally been available in all cases. Parts not on hand in PLL or in direct support ASL have been requisitioned and filled in a timely manner.

(c) Repair of signal equipment has been extremely poor.

The following list of signal items has been turned in for over 30 days (Item 1 thru 15 are major items or components).

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>DATE OF DEADLINE</u>
1. Telephone, TA 312/PT	7089
2. Telephone, TA-312/PT	7086
3. Telephone, TA-312/PT	7076
4. Telephone, TA-312/PT	7053
5. Telephone, TA-312/PT	7053
6. Telephone, TA-312/PT	7053
7. Telephone, TA-312/PT	7036
8. Telephone, TA-312/PT	7015
9. Telephone, TA-312/PT	6337
10. Telephone, TA-312/PT	7024
11. Receiver/Transmitter, RT-524(VRC-45)	7057
12. Receiver/Transmitter, RT-524(VRC-46)	7050
13. Amplifier, AM-1780(VIC-1)	7042
14. Receiver/Transmitter, RT-505(PRC-25)	7024
15. Transmitter, T-195(GRC-46)	6341
16. Operators Pack, TA-221/PT	7089
17. Microphones, M-80	7076
18. Microphones, M-80	7057
19. Microphones, M-80	7003
20. Microphones, M-80	7003
21. Headset, H-161	6341
22. Headset, H-161	6341
23. Headset, H-144/U	6323

(d) PLL Status. As of 30 April 1967, the current status of PLL is as shown in the following table:

<u>LINE</u>	<u>COLUMN 1</u>	<u>COLUMN 2</u>	<u>COLUMN 3</u>	<u>COLUMN 4</u>	<u>COLUMN 5</u>
	Total # of Line Items	% of total at 100% fill	% of total at 50% fill	% of total at 25% fill	% of total at 0 bal
1. Artillery	169	72%	11%	0%	17%
2. Auto & Eng	875	71%	7%	0%	22%
3. Signal	75	70%	0%	0%	30%
4. Qm & Chem	229	70%	7%	4%	19%
5. Total	1348	71%	7%	1%	21%

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(2) A water well in a very poor condition in the Van Quat Ka hamlet was repaired and a new well constructed in the Va Ba Taung hamlet. A total of 20 bags of cement were provided but all labor was performed by the villagers.

(3) Assistance to 5 of the 7 hamlet chiefs to obtain money for the construction of Medical Aid stations in each hamlet was provided. This money now has been received by the village chiefs, and plans are underway for the purchase of the required material. The two unassisted hamlets have aid stations; they are An Hung and Tan Dinh.

(4) Carpenter tool sets, saws, picks, and shovels have been requisitioned for each hamlet.

e. This unit was assigned an Interpreter in late February who has been instrumental in the excellent relations between this unit and the assigned hamlets.

6. (C) Personnel/Administration

a. This battalion is under OPCON of the 12th Marine Regiment which is organic to the 3d Marine Division. The 3d Marine Division is part of the III Marine Amphibious Force. This battalion is attached to I Field Force Vietnam Artillery for command less operational control. General Court-Martial jurisdiction and awards are administered by I Field Force Vietnam. Battery B, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery continues to be attached.

b. Normal S-1 activities have been conducted the last quarterly report dated 5 February 1967.

c. Strength

(1) Authorized and assigned strength for the period ending 30 April 1967:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>			<u>ASSIGNED</u>		
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
2d Bn 94th Arty	32	4	518	30	4	529
Btry B 6th Bn 27th Arty	2	0	110	3	0	121

(2) Changes during the period:

GAINS:	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	LOSSES:	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
2d Bn 94th Arty	0	1	129		1	1	181
Btry B 6th Bn 27th Arty	0	0	60		1	0	27

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(3) Casualties during the period included:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Killed in Action	3
Died of Battle Wounds	0
Wounded in Action	17
Missing in Action	0
Non-Battle Death	0
Non-Battle Casualties	1

d. Personnel Management. An enlisted infusion program is in effect to reduce this unit's rotational hump in September 1967. The following are numbers of replacements received and personnel reassigned:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>	<u>REASSIGNED</u>
February	44	40
March	13	16
April	89	118

e. Morale. The morale of this command is outstanding.

f. R&R Program. The following out-of-country R&R's have been allocated to this command:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
Bangkok	7	7	9
Hawaii	8	12	10
Hong Kong	6	7	6
Kuala Lumpur	1	6	1
Manila	1	1	1
Penang	0	0	3
Singapore	0	1	2
Taipei	9	10	8
Tokyo	8	9	8
TOTALS	40	53	48

g. Decorations and Awards. The following awards and decorations have been presented during this period:

Purple Hearts: 8

h. Mail. Battalion Mail Clerk picks up mail from APO 96269 and delivers to each battery.

i. Religious Services. Religious services are scheduled and held weekly by Protestant and Roman Catholic Chaplains assigned to adjacent Marine Corps units.

j. Medical. This battalion operates a battalion aid station under the supervision of the battalion surgeon. The following statistics for the period of this report are submitted:

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(1) Patients visits (unit personnel)	599
(2) Patients visits (other US Army personnel)	15
(3) Patients visits (US Marine Corps personnel)	8
(4) Admitted to Hospital	6
(5) Evacuated out of country	10

k. Discipline, law and order. Judicial and non-judicial actions include:

<u>ARTICLE 15a</u>	<u>SUMMARY COURT</u>	<u>SPECIAL COURT</u>	<u>GENERAL COURT</u>
20	1	0	0

l. Education. There are presently no educational facilities in the battalion, however, a request has been submitted to setup GED facilities and USAFI facilities. An intensive spoken language course in Vietnamese is also planned.

m. Safety. Recordable accidents are as follows: 1-vehicle, 1-Personnel.

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SECTION 2 (a) COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. (C) Personnel

a. Item: Shortage of Publications.

Discussion: Due to the short time between activation and redeployment of this battalion, the battalion did not have sufficient time to requisition and receive necessary publications prior to redeployment.

Observations: Units redeploying from CONUS to Vietnam should receive priority action on publications requisitions.

b. Item: Overdue Receipt of publications

Discussion: Receipt of publications from USAAGPC, Baltimore Md, 21220, takes approximately 90 days from date of requisition. It has been noted, however, that receipt of publications from the USAAGPC, St. Louis, Mo, 63114 takes from 30 to 45 days.

Observations: It takes twice as long to receive publications from Baltimore as it does from St. Louis. Action should be taken to speed up delivery time from Baltimore.

c. Item: Lack of information concerning medical evacuees.

Discussion: When a soldier is evacuated through medical channels from the I Corps zone, it is extremely difficult and occasionally impossible to obtain information as to the patients condition, prognosis, or whereabouts. This is partially due to communication difficulties, the variety of medical facilities, and the use of hospital ships.

Observations: Information concerning evacuees is required for casualty reports, accident reports, and line of duty investigations. A system of notifying the unit concerned of a patients status should be instituted.

2. (C) Operations:

a. Item: Propellant Charges.

Discussion: Approximately 20% of all powder charges arrived at the firing position in a damaged condition due to dents and cuts in the cannisters. Since the last reporting period, powder has been arriving with two boxes constructed around the cannister between the cannister flanges.

Observations: The damaged powder problem appears to have been solved.

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b. Item: Fuse Quick/Delay (M572)

Discussion: Delayed fuse action is absolutely required to penetrate the jungle cover and extensive bunkering systems in this area of operations. Missions observed by patrols and air observers indicate that in some instances fuses set to "delay" do not function properly.

Observations: Recommend research into the causes of malfunction and correction as soon as possible.

c. Item: Attacks on this Battalion.

Discussion: Following the displacement of artillery to Gio Linh and the subsequent attacks on North Vietnam from Gio Linh and Camp J J Carroll, this battalion and adjacent Marine units have been subjected to rocket, artillery, and mortar attacks of considerable intensity:

TIME	DATE	LOCATION	WEAPON	ROUNDS
2240	26 Feb	Gio Linh	81/82mm mortar	40
0045	27 Feb	"	"	80
1900	28 Feb	"	"	40
2042	28 Feb	"	"	75
----	1 Mar	"	"	UNK
0015	2 Mar	"	"	150
0100	2 Mar	"	"	50
0930	2 Mar	"	"	2
2357	6 Mar	Camp Carroll	132mm folding fin rocket	110
thru		"	102mm spin rocket	123
0630	17 Mar	"	82mm mortar	102
1920	20 Mar	Gio Linh	81/82mm and 122mm arty	500 (Total)
2300	31 Mar	"	81/82mm mortar	15
0013	2 Apr	"	"	20
0025	2 Apr	"	"	40
0057	3 Apr	"	"	30
1805	4 Apr	"	"	40
0100	9 Apr	"	"	30
0530	16 Apr	Camp Carroll	"	2
2300	26 Apr	Gio Linh	82mm mortars	25
1745	27 Apr	"	105/122mm arty	30
2100	27 Apr	"	"	700 (Approx)
0200	28 Apr	Dong Ha	140mm spin rockets	35
2309	29 Apr	Gio Linh	82mm mortar	30
1425	30 Apr	"	122mm arty	10
2154	30 Apr	"	105/122mm arty	5

Observations: AN/MPQ-4A Counter-Mortar radar sets and trained crews could well help alleviate the sustained casualty and equipment damage rate. (Note: 2 AN/MPQ-4's and 1 AN/MPQ 10 radars have been made available to the 12th Marine Regiment)

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d. Item: Effects of 132mm Fin Stabilized Rockets.

Discussion: A 2-3 second noise similar to that of jet aircraft precedes impact of the rocket. Several effects of impact are considered of significance and are of primary importance when devising personnel and equipment shelters. The surface burst is characterized by a 360 degree fragmentation pattern which not only sprays upward but sprays horizontally with a "grass-cutter" effect. Prone personnel without shelter within a 50 meter radius of the impact point probably would have less than 50 percent chance of survival. The rocket motor continues through the blast to imbed itself in the ground. The second major rocket effect indicates the use of delayed action fuze. The rocket penetrates the ground and explodes causing a camoflet or vented camoflet 6-8 feet deep and 5-6 feet in diameter. In both types of explosion, the rocket motor has been recovered from 21 to 25 feet in the ground past the point of entry. Personnel who saw the incoming rockets described high and low angles of fall indicating an adjustable fin or high angle capability. Gunnery techniques were obviously of a high order since all rockets landed on or near artillery and installations, or near installations which the NVA may have reasonably assumed to be primary importance, i.e. the Mess Hall of Headquarters Battery was hit whereas FDC was untouched. Both installations were similar in appearance. The accuracy also indicated a prolonged observation and plotting effort against Camp Carroll. All rockets were firec indirectly from a Northerly direction from an unknown range.

Observations: A direct hit by a 132mm rocket with delay fuze will penetrate any field shelter. However, there is no substitute for extensive overheading and sandbagging of personnel shelters to attenuate the secondary effects of rocket explosion. Sandbags, although torn, shredded and emptied of contents by fragments, were primarily responsible for saving numerous lives in this battalion.

e. Item: Effects of Mortar/Artillery on 175mm Powder.

Discussion: During the rocket/mortar attack on Camp Carroll on 6-7 March 1967, one powder bunker containing approximately 250-175mm powder cannisters recieived a direct hit with an 82mm mortar round. One cannister exploded spreading unburned powder granules over a wide area; another burst and burned, causing the cannister and lid to rocket in opposite directions. The exteriors of nine cannisters were charred, however, the powder appeared to have been uneffected; the powder was later burned deliberately. Two powder bunkers at Gio Linh were hit with mortar or artillery fire and exploded and burned completely. The bunkers were open at the top and the explosions/fire/debris were directed upward. Little lateral damage resulted.

Observations: Stored artillery powder should not be totally confined. The top of powder bunkers should not be covered so the explosion force will be directed upwards. Bunker walls should be as thick as possible, Troops in bunkers with overhead cover should not be effected by either explosions or debris.

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30 April 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

f. Item: VT Fuzes Bursting on Impact.

Discussion: This battalion has experienced some difficulty in obtaining the desired height of burst above the target with the M514A1 VT fuze. Until just recently, firing was limited to only Charge 1 and Charge 2 as this unit did not have the M514A1 VT fuze equipped with the Kel F plastic windshield. This discussion is based on results of firing VT fuzed with Charge 2. The procedures as listed in FM 6-40, paragraph 412, were followed on three different missions fired by aerial observers. In each mission the observer reported that the VT fuzes were bursting on impact. The chart range for those missions varies from 16,000 meters to 20,500 meters. During one mission, with no friendly troops in the area, the time of flight read under the elevational gage line was rounded down and 5 seconds subtracted and an additional factor of 40/R was added instead of 20/R to the site determined for the ground location. The VT fuze still burst upon impact. In another air mission, by rounding down and subtracting 7 seconds, an air burst was obtained.

Observations: This unit is continuing to experiment with VT fuzes whenever the tactical situation permits. It is desirable to arrive at a fuze correction from experience that not only is safe but will function as designed if and when a target is sighted where the VT fuze should be employed. Some bad lots of fuses, the terminal velocity of the projectile, the terrain characteristics of this area, or the angle of fall may be factors for improper functioning of the fuzes used to date. An attempt will be made to gain more information to present in the next quarterly report.

g. Item: Accuracy of firing.

Discussion: This battalion has experienced some excellent results at various ranges. A system of average VE's for each charge for each battery are applied in the MET+VE techniques for every round fired. All batteries utilize the graphical firing scales Gun, 175mm, 175AO (REV II) HEM 437. This unit still has the experimental models which were obtained from Fort Sill prior to any firing conducted there in the summer of 1966. Two plot GFT settings are primarily used for any azimuth on which one or more guns are firing. With this type GFT setting, the full range of GFT may be used without regard to transfer limits. Utilizing this system, one gun from each of three batteries fired at a registration point at an average range of 20,000 meters. Firing Charge 2, two of the batteries had their first rounds within 50 meters of the target and the third battery was within 100 meters. Another example using Charge 3 occurred at a range of approximately 30,000 meters. One battery had registered during the previous month at the above range. Firing the same

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battery, but with a different gun at a point 1000 meters from the registration point, the air observer sensed the first round as being within 100 meters of the target. However, firing at ranges below 12,000 meters, the decreased accuracy and large range dispersion prevent the 175mm gun from being desirable for adjustment type missions. At ranges under 12,000 meters, this unit normally fires only unobserved missions with a large safe buffer zone.

Observations: Firing the 175mm gun at ranges above 12,000 meters using good MET data, and by applying the MET+VE technique with a system of average VE's for each charge, excellent first round accuracy can be achieved. With a bursting radius of 95 meters, a first round within 100 meters of the target will produce the element of surprise as well as possible casualties. There is, however, a definite need to obtain a more stable propellant for ranges under 12,000 meters in order to increase the capabilities of the 175mm gun.

h. Item: Fire Extinguishers.

Discussion: During the frequent mortar attacks on Gio Linh and the rocket attack of Camp J.J. Carroll, large fires were started in powder pits, tents, and on the exterior of the 175mm guns. The built in extinguisher system on the gun is useless for external fires. The small hand extinguishers are ineffective against ammunition and tent fires but several can do a good job on external gun fires.

Observations: The large capacity dolly or trailer mounted foam type fire extinguishers are needed in all batteries to combat the fires which can be expected during mortar/rocket attacks.

3. (U) Security and Intelligence, Less Communication Intelligence.

a. Item: Overcoming moisture in Rawin Set AN/GhD-1A/

Discussion: This unit has experienced difficulty in controlling moisture in the Metro Rawin Set AN/GMD-1A and it's major components. Experience over the past 6 months has shown that collected moisture and repeated electron tube failure for this geographical location is and will continue to be a problem

Observations: To combat moisture collection and eliminate tube failure this unit has adopted the concept of leaving the main power supply (AC) turned on continuously 24 hours a day, this eliminating moisture collection and prevents repeated tube failure caused by heating and cooling of electron tubes.

b. Item: Substitution of Parts for Rawin Set AN/GMD-1A.

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Discussion: This unit experienced considerable difficulty with repeated failure of Electron Tubes, 3C23 (Azimuth driver and Elevation drivers) in the antenna control, C-578/GMD-1. Failure occurred at the rate of 4 tubes per week. Cause of the failure was attributed to excessive moisture and continuous vibrations caused by the proximity of the Rawin Set with firing batteries.

Observations: The 4 Electron tubes were replaced with solid state SCR Switching Unit # 1142256 Bendix Corp approximately 6 weeks ago resulting in satisfactory performance of the antenna control with no failures experienced. The continuous vibrations required the releveling of the Rawin Set constantly, this was eliminated by pouring 3 concrete pads (55 gallon drum cut in three sections were used as fs rms) at a point where the pedestal leg jack plates (outrigger) contacted the Ground. This completely eliminated the need to relevel the Rawin Set.

c. Item: Spare parts for Rawin Set Recorder.

Discussion: This unit has experienced some difficulty with spare parts for the Control Recorder C-577B/GMD-1. The parts that have caused problems are not stocked at unit level and as a result none of these items were brought to RVN.

Observations: The following list of spare parts should be included when a unit deploys to RVN.

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>FSN</u>
1. Time Print Relay	5945-199-7220
2. Time Duration Relay	7545-199-7221
3. Paper Advance Spring	6660-498-4537
4. Print Hammer Spring	6660-286-4537

Experience has shown that the recorder print ribbon has a tendency to dry out excessively. This problem was eliminated by soaking the print ribbon in Oil, Special Purpose, which prolongs the usefulness of the ribbon considerably.

d. Item: Receipt and Logging of Classified Documents.

Discussion: This unit receives classified documents from both Army and Marine sources. For the period of this report we have received and logged 764 Secret documents. Many of these documents contain very little, if any, classified information. There appears to be the problem of over-classification, in an attempt to affix a precedence in routing documents, this practice increases the administrative burden in the S-2 section particularly in view of the fact that the section does not have a files clerk by TO&E. The bulk of Secret documents received are in the form of Frag Orders, Situation reports, Intelligence Summaries and bulletins.

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Observations: All agencies should review classification procedures with an eye toward utilizing the Confidential classification as far as possible. This would reduce the bulk of the formal logging of Secret documents on DA Form 455 and the subsequent destruction certificates, DA Form 546. This problem exists due to the two separate and distinct logging systems used by the US Army and US Marine Corps. An informal logging system should be adopted for inter-service use in combat areas.

PART II: RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Operations.

a. Ammunition bunkers for separate ammunition should be the open type without overhead cover.

b. All 175mm Gun Battalion preparing for deployment to Vietnam should emphasize the gunnery technique of computing firing data using MET-VE.

2. Logistics.

a. Supporting task forces be staffed initially with personnel and equipment to provide adequate signal equipment maintenance support upon assuming such responsibilities.

b. Supporting task forces be staffed with sufficient personnel and handling equipment to perform their mission fully.

3. Other.

a. Billets and working areas which are used at night be sandbagged to provide protection during initial phases of rocket/mortar attacks.

b. Large portable fire extinguishers, preferable foam type, be provided to each gun section of 175mm gun battalion to fight ammunition bunker and gun fires.

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s/ Richard G Trefry
t/ RICHARD G TREFRY
LTC, Artillery
Commanding

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AVFA-AT-D (30 Apr 67)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1967, (RCS CSFOR-65)(2nd Bn, 94th Arty) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96350, 24 May 1967

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-GC-O&T, APO 96350

1. Concur with observations and recommendations contained in basic communication.

2. Reference Section 2, Part II, para 2: Use of support Task Forces should be limited and employed only for short periods of time. When a requirement for support of units exceeds 30 days the Task Force should be augmented and become an FSA.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



LEO E. ELLIS
LTC, Arty
Adjutant

2D

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AVFA-GC-OT (30 Apr 67)

2d Ihd

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350 16 JUN 1967

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO 96307

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the contents of the 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery operational report for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1967, and the preceding indorsement with the following comments.

2. (C) Reference Section I - Significant Unit Activities:

a. Paragraph 4b (2)(a): This headquarters has been advised by IFFORCEV Artillery that the reported shortage of CTA 50-901 items of equipment is being investigated. IFFORCEV Artillery has informed the organization to increase the stockage of these items through coordination with the supporting supply activity.

b. Paragraph 4b (2)(b): The shortage of fire extinguishers, refill support and request for new types of fire extinguishers is under investigation by IFFORCEV Artillery. Appropriate action will be taken to correct deficiencies noted upon completion of the investigation.

3. (C) Reference Section II, Part II - Recommendations:

a. Paragraph 1a - Operations: Concur. This recommendation appears to be practical and should merit consideration by other commanders.

b. Paragraph 1b - Operations: Concur. The ability of artillery organizations to apply MET plus VE corrections is essential in order to conserve ammunition, and to insure firing of the best available data. The procedure is outlined in section II, chapter 19, FM 6-40.

c. Paragraphs 2a and 2b - Logistics: IFFORCEV Artillery has been informed to investigate this matter to determine the extent of the alleged deficiencies, and, if required, to submit an appropriate message to 1st Logistical command with information copies provided to this headquarters and QUI NHON Support Command.

d. Paragraph 3a - Other: Concur. This recommendation is practical and should be employed by all US and FWMAF forces in built-up areas.

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DOWNGRADING AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

e. Paragraph 3b - Other: Concur. The organization has been informed that appropriate supply action should be taken as outlined in USARV message (U), 19073, DTG 251132Z March 1967, subject: Changes in Equipment Authorizations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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Kearney G. Stevens
KEARNEY G. STEVENS
CAPTAIN, ABC
ASST AG

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AVHGC-DST (30 Apr 67)

3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 8 AUG 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion (175mm) (SP), 94th Artillery as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning shortage of TA 50-901 equipment, section I, paragraph b(2) and (3), page 6 and paragraph 2a, 2d Indorsement: Concur. CTA 50-901 items have been a problem in the command, Follow-up action by USARV and 1st Logistical Command has resulted in expedited shipment from CONUS and redistribution of assets within USARPAC.

b. Reference item concerning lack of handling equipment at Dong Ha ASP, section I, paragraph 4b(2) and (4), page 6; section 2, part II, paragraph 2b, page 18 and paragraph 3c, 2d Indorsement: Nonconcur. The ammunition detachment operating the Dong Ha ASP has made no request for personnel or equipment augmentation. Qui Nhon Support Command indicated that during recent visits to this area the unit did not mention this problem. If a problem does in fact exist, a formal request to the Qui Nhon Support Command should be made so that positive action can be taken.

c. Reference item concerning fire extinguishers, section I, paragraph 4b, page 6; section 2, part I, paragraph 2h, page 16; section 2, part II, paragraph 3b, page 18 and paragraph 2b, 2d Indorsement: Concur with 2d Indorsements comments.

d. Reference item concerning ammunition bunkers, section 2, part II, paragraph 1a, page 18: Concur. Ammunition is packaged to withstand environmental exposure for varying periods of time. Barricaded overhead shelters (heavy) is an undesirable feature under certain conditions; however, light weight overhead protection is desirable to prevent direct exposure to sun and rain.

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3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

e. Reference item concerning spare parts for Rawin set recorder, section 2, part I, paragraph 3c, page 17: Concur. The following actions are being taken to improve the repair parts problem:

- (1) Emphasis on preparation of PLL's and ASL's.
- (2) Improved stock control of repair parts in depots.
- (3) Command action to expedite resupply as necessary.

Recommend AMC consider this observation to determine if the parts listed are appropriate for inclusion in the maintenance allocation to unit level.

f. Reference item concerning shortage and overdue receipt of publications, paragraph 1a and 1b, page 12: Comments concerning shortages of publications do not provide sufficient information to evaluate either the discussions or observations. More detailed information such as the exact type of publication is required. A recent change to the regulation on publications supply (AR 310-1) directs installation commanders to establish pinpoint publications accounts and to requisition an initial library of essential publications for deploying units prior to their activation date. The length of time it takes for the publications center in CONUS to fill requisitions for resupply of publications will vary depending on the availability of the publications desired. If the publications are available, experience factors show that the centers are capable of responding to requisitions within three weeks. Initial distribution of publications mailed under the pinpoint system arrive within forty-five days after date of publication. Should the center be out of stock, reprint action is required and the delay may be anywhere from six to eight weeks longer. Publications that are under revision and not available at the centers will be distributed when revised, automatically under DA pinpoint method direct to account holders. Follow up action will be taken by this office to determine the publications shortages of this unit.

g. Reference item concerning receipt and logging of classified material, section 2, part I, paragraph 3d: Concur. The observation that there is a need for originators to review classified material for downgrading is valid. The command has implemented a program for the review and downgrading of classified documents by originators. However, when a document is received and it is believed to be overclassified, the recipient must request that the originator review the document for possible downgrading. Nonconcur. The observation that there is a need for an informal logging system for inter-service use is invalid. AR 380-5 requires all classified material originated within DOD to be accounted for as prescribed therein.

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AVHGC-DST (30 Apr 67) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Therefore, an informal log for material originated by USMC is not authorized. Furthermore, the Marine logging system should have no effect on the Army system. A letter concerning this comment will be sent to the reporting headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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E. J. KENNEDY
Cpt AGC
Ass. Adjutant General

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GPOP-DT(30 Apr 67)

4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
from HQ, 2d Bn (175mm)(SP), 94th Arty (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)


HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558

15 SEP 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs in the
report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:




HEAVRIN SNYDER

CPT, AGC

Asst AG

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
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**ORGANIZATIONAL CHART 2D BN, 94TH ARTY
(AS OF 30 APRIL 1967)**

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